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In this article Professor Allen discusses Garofolo's "Criminology" and some modern
problems of criminal justice. The author is Professor of Law in Harvard University.
From 1948 to 1953 he was a member of the Faculty of Law in Northwestern
University where he had completed his professional training in 1946. From that year
until 1948 Professor Allen was Legal Secretary for the late Mr. Chief Justice Vinson of
the U. S. Supreme Court. He has served in various capacities in the federal, state
and local governments, including the chairmanship of the Citizen's Advisory Com-
mittee of the Illinois Sex Offenders Commission. He has published numerous arti-
cles in legal periodicals chiefly on criminal law and constitutional law topics.
The picture below is from the GREEN BAG, volume X-Editor.
For good reason it is customary
to identify Raffaele Garofolo as one
of the three leading exponents of the
Italian school of criminology, which
came into being during the closing
years of the nineteenth century. The
relationship with Lombroso and Ferri
is clear, but it ought not to obscure
the distinctive quality of Garofolo's
thought or the particular range of his
major interests.' No doubt the em-
phasis of his work was in large meas-
ure the product of his distinguished
professional career. Born a member
of the Italian nobility at Naples in
1852, he served in his mature years
as a lawyer, prosecutor, and mag-
istrate. In addition, he performed
the duties of professor of criminal
law and procedure in the university
of his native city. But from whatever
cause, there is exhibited in Garofolo's
writings a consistent concern with RAFFAELE. GARoFOLO
1 Cf. DE Quiaos, MODERN THEORIES OF CRIM1NALITY (De Salvio trans. 1911) 28: "With the
anthropologist Lombroso, the sociologist Ferri, and the jurisconsult Garofolo, the school of criminal
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practical reform of the criminal law and legal institutions associated with the.
administration of criminal justice. This, of course, is not to say that Garofolo's.
inquiries failed to encompass matters of theoretical scientific interest. But even
as he deals with such topics, he displays a continuing effort to relate the fruits of'
such investigation to the legal context and to gain insights which may be useful
in the practical business of legislation and administration. This note is struck in
the first paragraph of his "Criminology." Speaking of the then-recent efforts at
scientific study of criminality, he observes: "But when we come to consider how this.
theory may be applied to legislation, serious difficulties are encountered." 2 Later,
discussing Ferri's classification of criminal types, he concludes: "Being of no avail
to legislation it is consequently without practical interest."3 It is perhaps not too.
much to say that this detailed concern with the concrete problems of legal and in-
stitutional reform provides the chief source of interest in Garofolo's writings for
most modem readers.4
Although Garofolo enjoyed a long and productive scholarly career, he is known
principally in this country through his major work, the "Criminology." The first
edition of the book appeared in 1885 when Garofolo was only thirty-three years of
age. A second Italian edition was published six years later and a French version,
prepared personally by Garofolo, received a sufficiently wide response to justify
several subsequent editions. The excellent English translation completed in 1914
by Professor Robert W. Millar of the Northwestern University School of Law, is.
based largely on the French edition of 1905. 5
In approaching a study of the "Criminology" it is well that several general con-
siderations be kept in mind. The work in its original version appeared some seventy
years ago. Inevitably time has taken its toll. Many of the assumptions and the data
upon which these assumptions are based have been placed in serious doubt by
subsequent investigations. More fundamentally, the "Criminology" is in considerable
degree a product of certain important intellectual currents which profoundly affected
anthropology can be considered as fully established. Hence, one of its critics has called these three
men e-angelists and their works gospels. From that time on they are always mentioned in a kind of
trinity, a little divided at times only by Garofolo's political and penal conservatism."
2 GAROPOLO, CRIMINOLOGY (Millar trans. 1914) 3. The work will be cited hereinafter as "Crim.'
3 Id. at 134.
1 No doubt this element in Garofolo's work explains in part the highly favorable response to the
English translation of the "Criminology" in American legal periodicals. See 48 A.. L. REv. 945
(1914); 14 COL. L. REV. 545 (1914); 28 HARv. L. REV. 221 (1914); 10 ILL. L. RFv. 455 (1916);
63 U. of PA. L. REV. 148 (1914); 23 YALE L. JoUR. 554 (1914). The following comment appeared in
the above-cited discussion in the HARVARD LAw REVIEW at 222: "Its moderate tone and practical
nature make a good preparation for the audacious theorising of Lombroso and the brilliant ingenuity
of Tarde."
rIn the Translator's Preface to the English version, Professor Millar states at p. xiii: "The trans-
lator, however, has kept the second Italian edition constantly before him, and has found it of much
service. Indeed, the interests of the English version have at times seemed to require that the Italian
edition be laid under direct contribution. It is thus responsible for verbal deviations, here and there,
from the French text, for some amplification of statements of fact in relation to criminal cases
referred to by the author (containing, as a rule, a fuller account of such cases), and for slight additions




:social thought, during the last half of the nineteenth century and which have lost
much of their power to impress the modern mind and to stir the modern imagination.
*The pervasive influence of social Darwinism and the speculations of Herbert Spencer
.are, for example, clearly discernible at almost every - stage of Garofolo's argument.
For modern tastes there is perhaps a too-easy assumption of the inevitability of
:moral progress and the beneficence of political power.'
But this is far from denying the continuing interest of the work and its considerable
relevance to contemporary issues. For the "Crirni6logy" contributes a full measure
*of significant insights which are often largely indbpendent of the theoretical super-
-structure on which Garofolo built. Moreover, the essential honesty of his methods
.and eagerness to discipline his conclusions by a constant reference to fact does much
to bridge the years. There is pleasure, too, in following his lively and often closely-
reasoned argument. It is perilous to attempt evaluation of a writer's literary style
in translation, but the bite of his language emerges clearly enough. Thus, comment-
ing on certain of Lombroso's work, he states: "In his later writing the same writer
.contended that epilepsy is always to be found in the born criminal. This theory I
-shall not stop to discuss since the fact is'"far from being established. Moreover, it
is flatly contradictory of the theory of Ahvism, despite Lombroso's efforts'to recon-
•cile the two theories. It seems hardly possible to conceive our first parents as un-
happy epileptics. ' 7
TnE CONCEPT OF "NATURAL CRIME"
The starting point of any criminological system is the delimitation and definition
of its subject matter. Even witi the passing of the years, these basic and primary
issues remain in agitation and'controversy. Garofolo rightly saw, with a clarity not
matched by many who came'before and after him, that the prior questions to be
resolved center about the proper formulation of the concept of crime-the "criminal"
presupposes "crime."' Thus at the outset he observes that ".. . although the natural-
ists speak of the criminal, they have omitted to tell us what they understand by
the word crime."9
Perhaps'partly in reaction to the excesses of the Austinian school, Garofolo sharply
rejected as inadequate for scientific purposes the-notion that crime may properly
be defined as that conduct for which the law has provided penalties and has de-
6Another difficulty might well be mentioned. Many of Garofolo's illustrations and much of his
data relate to patterns of criminality then prevailing in southern Italy, Sicily, and Corsica. These
patterns, while perhaps not entirely unique, are sufficiently atypical to increase .the difficulties of
critical evaluation.
7 CRIM. 105-106.
8 Cf. FRRi, CRimiNAL SocioLoGY (Kelly and Lisle trans. 1917) 77-78: "Garofolo's definition
was, however, an original and happy attempt, although for my part, as Fioretti had already remarked
and as I have said elsewhere, I do not feel the antecedent necessity for such a definition. In my
opinion, a definition with which metaphysicians and classical jurists ever love to begin, can on the
contrary only be the ultimate synthesis. It should, therefore, come at the end and not at the beginning
of the researches of criminal sociology. And this is not only because the general reasons of the positive
method require it; but also because the difficulty raised by opponents and combatted by Garofolo
is not serious."
9 Cr m. at 3.
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nominated criminal."' This "juridical" conception, it is urged, fails in that it both
includes and excludes behavior properly encompassed in a "sociologic notion of
crime." For Garofolo only the latter is of concern to the scientific investigator; and
in giving content to this sociologic notion he formulates one of his most important
concepts, the idea of "natural crime." "Natural" he defines as that ".... which is
not conventional,... which exists in human society independently of the circum-
stances and exigencies of a given epoch or the particular views of the law-maker." 1'
In short, "natural crime" consists of that conduct which offends the basic moral
sentiments of pity (revulsion against the voluntary infliction of suffering on others)':
and probity (respect for property rights of others)) 3 The basic moral sensibilities.
appear in more or less advanced form in all civilized societies and are, indeed, essen-
tial to the coexistence of individuals in society. Hence, the true criminal against
whom society must make defense is he who has revealed the absence or deficiency
of either or both these essential moral capacities.
In further refining the concept, Garofolo makes clear that he is speaking only of
the sentiments of pity and probity as manifested by the average moral sense of the
community, which may fall considerably below the level of moral perception at-
tained by the exceptional and superior members of the group. Moreover, the truly
criminal act must be harmful to society. 4 At first blush, Garofolo's idea of natural
crime may appear as a latter-day revival of the jus gentium. And, indeed, he believed
that for the western European countries, which had arrived at near the same level
of cultural development, a true "law of nations" might be formulated in the penal
area, as evidenced by his draft of suggested principles for an international penal
code.' 5 Nevertheless, as he makes clear, the concept of natural crime does not consist
of a catalog of acts which are universally or widely conceived to be criminal. History,
chance, and the varying levels of social development have produced great differences.
in the kinds of overt behavior characterized as crime at various times and places.
The uniformity lies rather in the basic altruistic sentiments of mankind; and true
crime is that conduct which, upon evaluation by the average moral sense of the
particular society under consideration, is deemed offensive to those sentiments.'6
One further point of clarification needs to be stated. Garofolo does not intend to
limit offenses recognized by any government to those included in the category of
natural crime. He assumes that a great variety of other offenses will be defined and
10 See especially Chapter II "The Legal Notion of Crime." Id. at 54 et seq.
1Id. at 4.
12 Id. at 23 et seq.
13 Id. at 31 et seq.
14 Garofolo summarizes his position in the following manner: "From what has been said..., we
may conclude that the element of immorality requisite before a harmful act can be regarded as
criminal by public opinion, is the injury to so much of the moral sense as is represented by one or
the other of the elementary altruistic sentiments of pity and probity. Moreover, the injury must
wound these sentiments not in their superior and finer degrees, but in the average measure in which
they are possessed by a community-a measure which is indispensable for the adaption of the
individual to society. Given such a violation of either of these sentiments, and we have what may
properly be called natural crime." Id. at 33-34.
15 See Part IV: "Outline of Principles Suggested as a Basis for an International Penal Code." Id.
at 405 et seq.
16 Id. at 6-10.
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punished. Indeed, he makes the rather extraordinary assertion that "Beyond ques-
tion, every disobedience to law should be attended with a penal sanction .... 7
In this connection, however, he advances the interesting suggestion that in the
statutes such "police offenses" might better be included in a code separate from
that dealing with natural criminality." But for Garofolo, the chief function of the
natural crime concept is to delimit the area of conduct of major, perhaps exclusive,
concern to the scientific criminologist. 9
Garofolo's concept of natural crime has, as might be expected, produced its 'critics
and its qualified disciples.20 It is based fundamentally on the idea that for scientific
purposes, the concept of crime cannot be accepted as a legal category since the factors
which produce the legal definitions of crime are contingent and capricious and display
no consistent, unifying principle 1 The motivation is clear; and yet, it may be doubted
that so complete an elimination of the legal content of the concept has well served
the development of criminological theory 2n Certainly, the efforts to obtain agree-
ment on a definition of crime in purely naturalistic terms have not proven conspicu-
ously successful as the controversies which continue to agitate theory demonstrate.3
The condemnation of conduct through the political agencies is a relevant social fact
of the greatest importance. Any theoretical system which ignores or unduly mini-
mizes considerations of such relevance and importance is likely to produce results
which are partial and unsatisfactory. Moreover, this tendency may produce posi-
tive dangers in its practical applications. For a consideration of measures which
impose stringent disabilities on individuals cannot safely be isolated from the legal
and political values. Even within the assumptions of his concept of natural crime,
Garofolo cannot escape legitimate criticism. Thus it is probably true that an analysis
which attaches the idea of criminality only to violations of the moral "sentiments"
of pity and probity is incomplete and insufficiently sophisticated. One doubts,
for example, whether the particular horror often associated with certain kinds of
sexual offenses can be completely or adequately explained as a manifestation of pity
for the victim32 5 Nor do these categories comfortably encompass serious political
17 Id. at 34.18 Id. at 59.
19 This is perhaps stated most clearly in Id. at 47.
20 See, e.g., DE QuIRos, op. cit. supra note 1 at 28; FERRI, op. cit. supra note 8 at 80; TARDE,
PENAL PHILOSOPHY (Howell trans. 1912) 69 et seq. And see HALT, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL
LAW (1947) 547 et seq.; Tappan, Who Is the Criminal? 12 Am. Soc. REv. 96 (1947).
21 See, e.g., CPm. at 4. And note the comment of Tarde, op. cit. supra note 20 at 72: "The most
striking thing to be here observed is the sight of an evolutionist making this desperate effort to attach
himself to some fixed point in this unfathomable flood of phenomena and cast anchor exactly in
what is the most fluid and evasive thing in the world, that is to say, feeling."
22 See LLEwELLYN, Law and the Social Sciences-Especially Sociology, 62 HARv. L. REv. 1286,
1287 (1949).
23 See TAI'PAN, op. cit. supra note 20.
24 FER I, op. cit. supra note 8 at 80.
25 Cf. "In other words, a failure to punish a criminal is a kind of threat to the repressions which
each person places upon his own id." GRIrFrir, AN INTRODUCTION TO APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY (1934)
265, quoted in Harno, Rationale of a Criminal Code, 85 U. OF PA. L. RIv. 549 (1937). An interesting
account of public reaction in early nineteenth-century England to prisoners condemned to the




crime, particularly in a period of intense political conformity when conceptions of
morality are identified in significant measure with patriotic sentiments. 8
Nevertheless, Garofolo's concern with actual problems of legislation and adminis-
tration, already noted, tends to counterbalance many of the more dubious tendencies
of his theory. Furthermore, in emphasizing the relevance of "moral sentiment" to
the problem of defining criminal behavior, the concept of "natural crime" has a
continuing relevance, even though probably not precisely that which Garofolo
intended. Certainly, the modern legislator, with Garofolo, can gain little solace or
assistance from the shibboleth that crime is whatever the legislature says it is. For
the legislator, particularly at a time when governmental power invades more and
more aspects of social life, there are few problems of policy more pressing than
identifying and reconciling the social interests to be protected by political power,
determining which of these interests can sensibly be defended by criminal sanctions,
and designing such sanctions in the form most likely to attain the desired ends.F
No perceptive legislator believes that he is completely at large in this area. There are
certain regularities of social and individual behavior which can be ignored only at
peril. Garofolo's identification of serious criminality with immorality suggests one
of these limiting factors.28 His distinction between the "natural" crimes and the
"police offenses" points to one of the most serious problems confronting the expand-
ing welfare state, 29 however imperfectly he may have understood the complexities
of policy in the latter category of offenses.30 Finally, his insistence that there are
problems here which demand systematic investigation of the underlying facts of
social and individual behavior produces an emphasis of a value which has not dimin-
ished with the passing of the years.
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE CRIUINAL
In Garofolo's theoretical system, the concept of natural crime serves the primary
end of identifying the true criminal against whom measures of social defense must
25 Garofolo deals at some length with political crimes and notes that ".... the act which is normally
a political crime may become a natural crime when a society suddenly returns to a condition in which
the collective existence is threatened." Writing in a happier time he optimistically observes: "But
at the present day the state of war is a crisis of short duration. As pacific activity succeeds to predatory
activity, the morality of the state of peace succeeds to that of war, .. ." "Crim." at 39.
27 See MICHAEL AND ADLER, CRum, LAw AND SOCIAL SCIENCE (1933) 23-26, 352-361.
11 Garofolo's fellow-countryman, Beccaria, had written perceptively on these matters a century-
and-a-quarter earlier. See especially Chapter XXXIII of the latter's CRIAEs AND PUNISHMENTS
(1764. Eng. printing, 1872) 126-129, the opening sentences of which observe: "Smuggling is a real
offence against the sovereign and the nation; but the punishment should not brand the offender
with infamy, because this crime is not infamous in the public opinion. By inflicting infamous punish-
ments, for crimes that are not reputed so, we destroy the idea where it may be useful. If the same
punishment be decreed for killing a pheasant as for killing a man, or for forgery, all difference
between those crimes will shortly vanish. It is thus that moral sentiments are destroyed in the
heart of man;.. ."
21 CLNARD, THE BLACK MARKET (1952); Hall, op. cit. suepra note 20 at 279; JACKSON, Absolute
Prohibition in Statutory Offenses, 6 CAUB. L. JOUR. 83 (1936); LEE, The Enforcement Provisions of
the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 6 L. AND CONT. PROB. 70 (1939); PERKINs, The Civil Offense, 100
U. or PA. L. REv. 832 (1952); SAYRE, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 COL. L. REv. 55 (1933).
10 See note 17 supra.
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be taken. Natural crime is behavior which violates certain basic moral sentiments.
The true criminal is he whose altruistic sensibilities are lacking or are in a deficient
state of development. The concepts of crime and the criminal are thus integrally
related. Garofolo, to be sure, makes clear his conviction that "our knowledge of
the criminal is not limited to his acts."'" But it is perhaps this joining of the ideas
of crime and criminal which, leads to the frequent emphasis on the act as a primary
index of criminality. In this respect Garofolo's assumptions often tend to approach
those of classical criminology, however much they may diverge in other particulars.12
It is not surprising that in his efforts to delineate the characteristics of the true
criminal, Garofolo should turn first to the views of the criminal anthropologists,
particularly those of Lombroso. It is clear that Garofolo approached with great
interest and considerable sympathy the then-current efforts to demonstrate the
association of criminality with certain anatomical and physiological characteristics. 3
He finds, for example, that the undue size of the mandibles is "an unmistakable sign
of brutality or violence"14 and that it is "generally admitted that in criminals, the
occipital region exhibits a much greater development than the frontal region. 35
Nevertheless, on the whole, his treatment of these matters reveals commendable
caution and a healthy detachment. His ultimate conclusion was that the theories
describing the criminal as a distinct anthropological type had not yet been proved.
"But what criminal anthropology really lacks," he asserts, "... is convincing proof
that a given character of the skull or skeleton is found more often among criminals
than among persons presumably honest."3 6 After reporting the frequency of striking
degenerative or regressive characteristics in murderers under his observation, he
adds: "Still, these characteristics are not always the same: sometimes it is one which
is present, sometimes another. The murderer type cannot be described anthro-
pologically. 3 7 He was aware, also, of the difficulties inherent in validating hypotheses
in this area, for he notes the problem of accurately identifying the criminal and
non-criminal "pair" for the purposes of trustworthy comparison.38
Having found the emphasis of Lombroso's theories inadequate for his purposes,
Garofolo advances his second major concept, the idea of psychic or moral "anomaly."
a, C~a. at 66.
32 See e.g., Beccaria, op. cit. supra note 28. This parallelism is most clear in Garofolo's discussion
of the murderer and violent offender, less clear in his treatment of the offender against property
rights. Thus, as to the latter, he writes: "'What!' some one may exclaim, 'Would you make no
distinction in punishment between the man who has stolen twenty francs and the man who has
stolen but twenty centimes?'
"My answer is that I do not know, for the question is one which cannot be decided abstractly.
The thing important here to determine is-which one of these two thieves has the greater criminal
aptitude, and is thus the greater danger to society? It may well be the former, but it may quite as
well be the latter." Cim. at 299.
"A survey of modem work in this area is presented in Snodgrasse, Crime and the Constitution
Human: A Survey, 42 J. Can. L. AND CRMINOLOGY 18 (1951).
Cms. at 71.
3Id. at 67.
36 Id. at 74.
37 Id. at 77. -
811Id. at 75.
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The true criminal lacks a proper development of the altruistic sensibilities. This
lack or deficiency is not simply the product of circumstance or environmental condi-
tioning but has an organic basis. For Garofolo "There is no such thing as the casual
offender-if by the use of this term we grant the possibility of a morally well-or-
ganized man committing a crime solely by the force of external circumstances." 9
Moreover, the moral anomaly is to be carefully distinguished from insanity or mental
disease. The former is not a pathological condition but rather a "psychic variation"
appearing much more frequently among members of "certain inferior races" than
in modern civilized societies. 0 That the moral anomaly is hereditarily transmissible
he finds "established by unimpeachable evidence."' But the precise physical basis
of the moral anomaly he is unable to describe.42 At times he refers to it as the product
of "some mysterious atavism.1 4 At others, as the result of moral degeneracy of
more recent origin.4.4 Ultimately, he says, "The only safe conclusion which we are
justified in forming is that criminals have regressive characteristics-characteristics
which indicate a degree of advancement lower than that of their neighbors." 45
It is apparent that these ideas tend to relegate the social and environmental
factors of criminality to positions of secondary importance. Clearly, too, such as-
sumptions profoundly affected Garofolo's conclusions as to practical measures of
crime prevention and repression. He regarded education as chiefly determinative of
the kinds of crime committed rather than as an agency for elimination of crime.48
He was skeptical of economic distress as a cause of crime though, again, he did not
deny that economic conditions may affect the form in which crime is manifested. 4
To sound family environment and religious instruction, especially when directed
"Id. at 95-96. And see: "Hardly anything could be more inaccurate, in my opinion, than the
adage: 'Occasion makes the thief.' To be true, the phrase should be: 'Occasion enables the thief to
steal.' " Id. at 226.
4
'OId. at 99-105.
41 Id. at 92. For the modem reader, the evidence for the hereditary transmissibility of criminal
propensities adduced by Garofolo often seems particularly inconclusive and the conclusions derived
therefrom at times naive and unsophisticated. Certainly, these conclusions often appear to ignore
alternative explanations which in the absence of conclusive evidence are at least equally persuasive.
Thus after noting the allegedly higher frequency of criminality among children of elderly parents,
he seems to attribute this phenomenon exclusively to the hereditary transmission of psychic traits
attributable to old age. Id. at 93.
42 "We shall therefore leave the anatomic aspect of the subject and direct our attention to the
criminal's psychic anomaly, without admitting or denying that this latter may have a purely physical
source." And in a footnote he quotes with approval a statement attributed to Benedikt "We are
very far from possessing an anatomy of molecules." Id. at 79.
4 1 Id. at 99-102, 105-111.
44 Ibid.
45 Id. at 109.
46 Id. at 137-140.
47 Id. at 142-165. "From what has been said up to this point, the two following conclusions may
be drawn: "(1) The present economic order, that is to say, the distribution of wealth, as it exists
today, is not a cause of criminality in general. (2) The fluctuations which are wont to occur in the
economic order may bring about the increase of one form of criminality, but this increase is com-
pensated by the limitation of another form. These fluctuations are, therefore, possible causes of
specific criminality." Id. at 164.
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to the child of tender years, he attributed more significance as preventive factors. "-
But even the latter elements were hardly conceived as of first importance. "Without
doubt," Garofolo writes, "external causes such as tradition, prejudices, bad examples,.
climate, alcoholic liquors, and the like are not without important influence. But in
our opinion, there is always present in the instincts of the true criminal, a specific-
element which is congenital or inherited, or else acquired in early infancy and be--
come inseparable from his psychic organism."4 9 Nevertheless, these "external fac--
tors," even if of secondary importance, must be taken into account. He did not
doubt that the manifestation of even the innate criminal propensities can often be-
repressed by "a favorable concurrence" of external circumstances." The devising
of appropriate measures of repression thus becomes the practical problem of central.
concern.
But in Garofolo's view, the organic deficiency in moral sensibilities, characteristic.
of true criminality, varies in significant degree from one criminal to another. These
variations make necessary a more particular classification of criminal types before
intelligent consideration of repressive measures is possible; for differences in the-
types require differences in the measures to be applied. Garofolo identifies four basic-
criminal classes which, though distinct, are yet related in that each is characterized
by a deficiency in the basic altruistic sentiments of pity and probity. These four
classes are those of (1) the murderer, (2) the violent criminal, (3) the thief, and-
(4) the lascivious criminal.5'
The murderer is the man in whom altruism is wholly lacking.52 The sentiments of
both pity and probity are absent, and such a criminal will steal or kill as the occa-
sion arises. This extreme form of the moral anomaly is frequently revealed in the
very circumstances of the crime committed. The lesser criminals, on the other hand,.
may be more difficult to identify; and here psychologic and anthropologic examina-
tion may be required to assist in his proper classification. These lesser offenders fall
into two major groups: violent criminals, characterized by the lack of pity, and
thieves, indicated by lack of probity. The violent criminal may often be guilty of
offenses against the person of the type particularly characteristic of a given locality.
Such crimes Garofolo terms endemic offenses.53 Admittedly, these patterns of criminal
behavior are strongly influenced by environmental factors. But though imitation.
plays a significant part in such acts, the offender is an abnormal man, as evidencedi
by the fact that even where endemic criminality is rampant, such offenses are com-
mitted by a small minority of the population. The violent criminal may also commit.
crimes of passion, sometimes under the influence of alcohol. For Garofolo, such
crimes, committed in a fit of anger, are indicative of inferior innate moral capacities.
"Moreover," he adds, "it has been my uniform experience as a criminal magistrate
that men who have taken life under the influence of liquor are nearly always persons.
48Id. at 140-141.
' Id. at 95.
"Id. at 97.




who had sustained a previous bad character or had been formerly convicted of
similar offenses." 54
Garofolo recognizes that the thieves, his second major subdivision of lesser crimi-
nals, may be more the product of social factors than the criminals in other classes. 5
Certain environments, particularly, contribute to crimes against property. "The
limits of such an environment need not be wide;" he writes, "two or three evil com-
panions, sometimes a single intimate friend are sufficient to lead a youth into this
sort of crime."56 Nevertheless, many manifestations of such behavior can only be
attributed to "a remote atavism" and, in other cases, to a general deficiency in
"'moral energy." Finally, there is the rather amorphous category of lascivious crimi-
nals.5 Many sexual offenders, he recognizes, must be classified among the violent
criminals. The behavior of others is the result of mental disorder. But fitting com-
fortably in neither category is a group of sexual offenders, requiring separate classi-
fication, whose conduct is characterized less by the absence of the sentiment of pity
than by a low level of moral energy and deficient moral perception.
THEEomEs AND MEASURES or SociAL DEFENSE
In a sense, all of Garofolo's major concepts relating to crime and the criminal
may be taken as providing the preliminary groundwork for his consideration of
social defense against criminality. Almost the entire second half of the "Criminology"
is devoted to a study of the theories and measures of crime prevention and repression.
For the modem reader, this portion of the work contains some of Garofolo's most
interesting and perceptive pages.
Garofolo's starting-point in considering the problems of intelligent community
response to crime is revealing, for he founds his thought on one of those analogies
characteristic of the social Darwinism of his day. In nature, through the processes
of natural selection, the penalty for lack of adaptation is elimination. The true crimi-
nal by the absence or deficiency of the basic altruistic sentiments similarly demon-
strates his "unfitness" or lack of adaptation to his social environment. Elimination
from the social circle is thus the penalty indicated. "In this way, the social power
will effect an artificial selection similar to that which nature effects by the death of
individuals inassimilable to the particular conditions of the environment in which
they are born or to which they have been removed. Herein the State will be simply
following the example of Nature.""8
Whatever may be said concerning the integrity of the analogy so drawn, it clearly
produces assumptions of the greatest importance in Garofolo's thought. In the first
place, the emphasis on elimination results in a theory of penalties or treatment which
makes incapacitation of the criminal the consideration of central importance. Thus,
at the outset, deterrence of potential offenders and reformation of the criminal are
relegated to positions of secondary or incidental significance. Second, the analogy
t4Id. at 117.
55 Id. at 125-130.
56 Id. at 127.
51 Id. at 130-131.
58 Id. at 219-220.
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relating criminal penalties to "natural selection" is suggestive of the types of penal-
ties which may properly be imposed and, perhaps, serves as a kind of moral justifica-
tion for criminal punishment by identifying it with the scheme of the natural universe.
It is upon these basic assumptions that Garofolo constructs his program of criminal,
sanctions. Although his proposals are elaborated at considerable length,59 they can
be stated in their essence rather succinctly. The fundamental purpose to be sought
is the elimination from society of those who because of moral anomaly are incapable
of social adaptation. The surest and most efficient form of elimination is death. And.
death is the sanction clearly indicated when the offender has demonstrated his.
complete absence of moral sensibilities and who is hence "forever incapable of social
life." 6 While there should be no hesitation to apply the death penalty in such cases,.
the moral sentiments of the community will not permit its imposition on offenders.
in whom the psychic anomaly appears in less extreme form. For, as Garofolo ob-
serves, "the death penalty has always excited public indignation when inflicted for
offenses not seriously violating the moral sense."'" For these lesser offenders some.
measure of adaptation is always possible, and the practical problem is to find the
environment which will make adaptation probable. Here again, the question is one
of degree, and elimination may be relative as well as absolute. There are some who,
like certain types of violent criminals, professional thieves, and habitual criminals.
in general, are incompatible with any civilized environment. Elimination in these
cases must take the form of life imprisonment or overseas transportation. The latter,
where available, is much to be preferred on the grounds both of security and hu-
manity." In dealing with young offenders and those whose behavior has been strongly
influenced by environmental factors, commitment for indefinite periods in penaL
agricultural colonies may be indicated. 3 There are also cases where elimination need_
go no further than expulsion of the offender from his particular social situation
which may accordingly involve the permanent loss of rights to practice a given
profession (where those rights have been abused) and the denial of certain civil and.
legal privileges.64 Finally, there are offenders who have committed true crimes but
in whom the moral anomaly has revealed itself much less clearly. Here the appro-
priate sanction is enforced reparation. Damages are to be assessed in sufficient
amount not only adequate for complete indemnification of the injured party but to.
cover the expenses incurred by the state as a result of the offender's dereliction.
If the offender's means are inadequate, his labor must be devoted to the required.
reparation.65
59 Id. at 220-29. And see the final chapter of the work entitled THE RATIONAL SXsTxs OF-
PUNmsHmENT, Id. at 372 et seq.60 Id. at 224.
61 Id. at 223.62 Id. at 224-225.
6Id. at 225.
CIbid.
6- Garofolo's idea of "enforced reparation" is one of his most interesting contributions. Included
as an appendix to the English translation is a paper on the subject submitted by him to the Inter-
national Penitentiary Congress of Brussels in 1900. Id. at 419-435. Cf. LEx, Restitution or Compensa-
tion, and the Criminal Law, 34 LAW MAG. AND REV. 286 (1909); BATES, PRISONS AND BEYONiD
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Even this brief recital of Garofolo's program of repressive measures casts consider-
able light on his purposes and assumptions. There is revealed, for example, his
conviction that the legal sanctions ought to be modeled upon consideration of the
psychic characteristics of the particular offender, as well as his dissatisfaction with
the conventional penal measures in this respect. As disclosed by his advocacy of the
completely indeterminate sentence and particularly the expansion of capital punish-
ment, stern penalties were for him an essential ingredient of a rational criminal code.
That he desired as broad a use of the death penalty as has sometimes been supposed
is less clear, however; for he does not estimate the fraction of the total criminal
population consisting of those totally bereft of altruistic sentiments which make up
the class eligible for capital punishment.
But a satisfactory appraisal of Garofolo's thought on these matters requires a
more particular examination of his theories of punishment and his analysis of com-
peting penal philosophies. A comparison of his position with certain of the postulates
of classical criminology may be particularly instructive. Garofolo at the outset reveals
fundamental theoretical differences with the classical school in his unequivocal rejec-
tion of the idea of moral responsibility as a basis for criminal liability. Consistently
with the positivist position,6 6 he rejects the notion of freedom of the will and accepts
a thorough-going determinism.Y To Garofolo the idea of moral responsibility is
basically inconsistent with the objective of social defense, for it is the offender least
capable of making and acting upon moral judgments who is most dangerous to
social interests. "... [WIhen we undertake to ascertain whether a man is really
responsible for what he does," he writes, "we always end by discovering that he is
not. It is the fallacy which pervades the entire system that the present ineffective-
ness of repression is due. The whole blame rests upon the two principles of moral
responsibility and penal proportion."6s
Since Garofolo's day the concept of responsibility has proved a persistent source
of acrimony and controversy. 9 Without agitating these issues further, it may be
relevant to suggest that the explicit rejection of the idea of moral responsibility
presented Garofolo with certain theoretical difficulties and to question whether he
(1938) 292-294; MICHAEL AND WECHSLER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS AUMNISTRATION (1940) 537-540'
The views of Bentham on "pecuniary satisfaction" also provide an interesting comparison. See
BENTHAM, THEORY OF LEGISLATION (Eng. ed. 1871) 282 el seq. It should be noted that Bentham
receives only one rather disparaging reference in the CRIMINOLOGY (at p. 55), and Garofalo demon-
strates no great familiarity with his work.
66 Cf. the statement of Fern in his chapter entitled "The Positive School of Criminology":
"Positive psychology has demonstrated that the pretended free will is a purely subjective illusion."
FERRI, op. cit. supra note 8 at 38.
67 CRIM. at 273-287. Compare the statement of one of the leading Italian exponents of the
classical school in Carrara, PROGRAIMA DEL CuRso DE DEREcHo (Span. ed. 1925) 31 quoted in
Amadeo, SCHOOLS OF PENAL THOUGHT REFLECTED IN MODERN PENAL LEGISLATION 5: "I do not
waste my time in philosophical questions, I presuppose the existence of the free will and the moral
culpability of man, because without it is impossible to build a criminal science."
65 Cpus. at 337.
The enormous literature in this field is familiar and requires no citation. Attention may be
called, however, to a recent discussion: "Criminal Responsibility and Psychiatric Expert Testi-
mony," Comm. on Psych. and Law of the Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry (May, 1954).
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succeeded in consistently maintaining the determinism he asserted. Given the im-
portant role of the "moral sentiments" in his conceptions of both crime and the
criminal, Garofolo's determinism produced for him the formidable task of separating
the idea of morality from that of moral responsibility. He approaches this task by
advancing what might be termed an esthetic theory of moral values. We feel admira-
tion for physical virtues such as beauty, strength and grace, and are repelled by
the absence of these qualities quite independently of whether the individual possess-
ing any of these traits is free to have other virtues or defects. This is equally true
of the moral qualities. "The praise of virtuous and the blame for vicious acts really
presents the same case.... "Merit' and 'demerit' have always relation to acts
dependent upon moral qualities. The words themselves require no change. All that
is needed is a correct understanding of their meaning." 70 An interesting test of Garo-
folo's position relates to the treatment of the insane criminal. Garofolo emphatically
insists that although the insane offender is a criminal7' and may be quite as dangerous
as any other offender, capital punishment must not be imposed upon him. This
withholding of the death penalty, completely consistent with the classical conception
of responsibility, would appear, at least initially, to involve Garofolo in contradiction.
But Garofolo denies any inconsistency. A necessary requirement for the imposition
of capital punishment, he says, "is that sympathy for the criminal has ceased to
exist." What is the source of this sympathy for the insane man which persists
despite the danger of his acts? Garofolo first replies that we recognize in him a po-
tential capacity for social life: "Insanity does not engender a permanent moral
character: the perversity in this case is transient and capable of change."" But
surely, many insane offenders, under the present state of knowledge, display at
least as unfavorable a prognosis as those whom he would consign to the death penalty.
Garofolo's ultimate refuge seems to lie in the almost metaphysical distinction "be-
tween the natural instincts innate in the individual, the instincts which go to make
up his real or irreducible character, and [in the case of the insane] the adventitious
instincts resulting from physical deterioration." 74
In turning to the explicit consideration of competing penal philosophies, the
modern reader will discover some of Garofolo's most interesting insights. Naturally
enough, he rejects the idea of vengeance or moral expiation as a sufficient theoretical
basis for penal sanctions.75 The idea that punishment will produce a moral regenera-
tion of the offender through remorse and repentance fails because, by his very na-
ture, the true criminal lacks the moral capacities the theory assumes. Nevertheless,
70 CjM!. at 304-305.
71 In discussing the criminal accountability of the insane, Garofolo distinguishes between those
whose mental illness has completely destroyed the capacity for ideation and those in whom "the
faculties of ideation" are not altogether destroyed. The idea of criminality would not attach to the
former: "For unless act corresponds with intention, crime does not exist." Id. at 280. Even as to
the latter who would be labeled criminal, special methods of treatment would be applied. Cf. FEaaI,
op. cit. supra note 8 at 356-363.
72 CRm. at 282.
73 Id. at 283.
14 Id. at 284.
75 Id. at 230-239.
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he finds sound historical basis for the notion that criminal penalties represent in
some measure a manifestation of socialized vengeance. Nor is he at all hostile to the
sense of outrage and repugnance produced in honest men by the true criminal. For
the feeling of outrage provides the social mechanism through which the rational goal
of elimination is reached, however imperfectly this may be understood by the public
at largeZ6
Garofolo's conception of criminality as something organic and innate in the
offender leads, as might be expected, to a considerable skepticism of the possibilities
of reformation through education or other modes of treatment." Actually, some of
his proposals, already noted, for handling offenders whose crimes reveal a consider-
able environmental influence are perhaps more in accord with the reformative ideal
than he himself suspectedY Moreover, his emphasis on the individualization of
punishment has probably placed his influence, in the long run, on the side of the
correctionalist goals. Nevertheless, his criticism of the reformative theory is an
essential part of his thought, and his observations on this subject even yet supply a
useful antidote for the more utopian and irresponsible assertions of some of the
correctionalists. At the outset he avoids the error, too often committed, of conceiving
that any system of enforced treatment, whatever its motives and purposes, can be
stripped of punitive aspects. "The mere deprivation of liberty, however benign the
administration of the place of confinement, is undeniably punishment." 9 He notes,
furthermore, that the existence of other social goals and values places limits on what
may be done in the interest of reformation, assuming that the latter can be accom-
plished."0 Nor should the prosaic problems of the public purse or the matter of
personnel be ignored. "Where are we to find a sufficient number of these soul-physi-
cians?" he asks. "And what of the expense of such an undertaking?" And would the
7 "Public sentiment thus coincides with the rational method of social reaction and, perhaps un-
consciously, has no other tendency than that of bringing about the same effect. It is important
however, to notice that this tendency is not the direct result of any process of reasoning by which
is demonstrated the social utility of elimination. .. ." Id. at 234.
77 Id. at 255-269.
78 It should be noted, also, that, to a degree not often fully appreciated, the reformative goal was
given recognition by the classical criminologists. In this connection, see Bentham, op. cit. supra
note 65 at 338-339: "It is a great merit in a punishment to contribute to the reformation of the
olgender, not only through the fear of being punished again, but by a change in his character and
habits. This end may be attained by studying the motivewhich produced the offense, and by applying
a punishment which tends to weaken that motive. A house of correction to fulfill this object, ought
to admit a separation of delinquents, in order that different means of treatment may be adapted to
the diversity of their moral condition." (Italics in the original.)
19 CRi. at 256.
80 "All this no doubt is very admirable. It is based, however, upon an utterly false notion of
State omnipotence. It completely ignores the fact that society, like any natural organism, undergoes
a development which is slow and gradual, a development in which the law-maker is a minimum
factor. But what of the practical side of the question? Has this, at least, been approached? For if
crime is a symptom and its cause is recognizable, it is the business of a good system of social thera-
peutics to deal with this cause, provided that it is capable of yielding to treatment. In this lies the
whole question: What are the means?" Id. at 179. Speaking of Ferri's program of "penal substi-
tutes," Garofolo states: "His plan involves nothing less than the complete making over of a whole
system of social and economic legislation." Id. at 182. And compare Dession, Psychiatry and the
Conditioning of Criminal Justice, 47 YALE L. JOUR. 319, 339-340 (1938).
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cure effected by this "moral therapy" survive the offender's return to his old haunts?
Fundamentally, however, Garofolo's objections are based on his conviction of the
fixity of character types. His hopes for substantial progress were largely confined
to reformative programs of the Elmira type directed to the very young offender.8
But perhaps most interesting and significant is Garofolo's analysis and criticism
of the classical theories of deterrence." Although he ultimately rejects the deterrence
of potential offenders as an adequate theoretical basis for criminal penalties, he
reveals a more perceptive understanding of the theory than often displayed by
its critics. He recognizes, at the outset, that justification for the deterrent theory
need not be rested solely on the direct intimidatory effect produced on potential
offenders by the threat of penal sanctions. Rather, in more subtle fashion the criminal
penalties may regulate behavior by producing and reinforcing general moral atti-
tudes toward certain forms of conduct. Thus the law, by making such behavior
unrespectable, subjects the indiidual to powerful extra-legal sanctions. "No doubt
for many persons, the consciousness of the evil involved would destroy any pleasure
which the criminal act might afford and is therefore sufficient to cause abstention
from crime. But even these persons involuntarily think of the extra legal social
reaction attendant upon the offense, namely, by their honest neighbors; and this
thought is continually strengthening their resolution to abstain from the acts in
question."8' Without the stimulus of these sanctions, the moral sentiments "would
tend to weaken and even, in the course of time, might altogether disappear." ''
It is apparent, therefore, that in this regard Garofolo's rejection of the position
of classical criminology was by no means complete. Indeed, an important part of
his justification for the use of the death penalty in proper cases is the assumed in-
timidatory result.81 Nevertheless, deterrence, while an important and desirable
effect of criminal penalties, cannot be accepted by Garofolo as the proper criterion
of punishment. This conclusion is reached on the interesting ground that the de-
terrent theory offers no clear standards by which either the kind or amount of
punishment can be determined.8" How is the legislature to measure in advance the
quantum of punishment necessary to prevent a given form of conduct in the various
social circumstances in which it may appear?8 How is the danger to social interests
81 Cm. at 266-267.
821d. at 239-251.
8Id. at 241. Compare the statement of Stephen quoted in ANDENAEs, General Prevention-
Illusion or Reality? 43 J. Clm. L. AND CRMNOLOGY 176, 189 (1952): "Some men, probably, abstain
from murder because they fear that if they committed murder they would be hanged. Hundreds of
thousands abstain from it because they regard it with horror. One great reason why they regard it
with horror is that murderers are hanged with the hearty approbation of all reasonable men."
84 Crum. at 242.
5Id. at 377-378.
86 Id. at 245 el seq.
S7 These difficulties did not escape the classical writers. See, e.g., BEccAwA, op. cit. supra note 28
at 30: "If mathematical calculation could be applied to the obscure and infinite combinations of
human actions, there might be a corresponding scale of punishments, descending from the greatest
to the least; but it will be sufficient that the wise legislator mark the principal divisions, without




of such behavior to be reflected proportionately in the penalties applied? This in-
herent uncertainty may result either in an excess or a deficiency of punishment.
In times of stress and insecurity the effort to deter may result in draconian measures
with consequent injury to individual and social interests. On the other hand, the
stipulation of the quantum of punishment in advance often requires the release of
still-dangerous offenders to the community. For Garofolo, the only rational criterion
is that which measures the penalty by reference to the characteristics of the particular
offender.
Certainly, Garofolo's analysis of deterrence has point and relevance. The diffi-
culties he suggests are real. Although the assumptions of the deterrent theory con-
tinue to dominate most criminal legislation, there has been little systematic effort
to test and validate these assumptions through empirical study.88 Few today would
assert that considerations of deterrence are in themselves adequate for the construc-
tion of a modern system of criminal justice. Nevertheless, it may properly be asked
whether in some measure these uncertainties, which Garofolo deplores, are not in-
herent in any program of action and whether he adequately appreciated the
difficulties of his own position. In the first place, it should be noted that for the vast
area of penal regulation falling outside the confines of "natural crime," Garofolo
fully embraces the deterrent theory with all its infirmities. 89 Second, it seems clear
that Garofolo never fully appreciates the problematical nature of identifying and
evaluating those criminal characteristics in the individual which make him a threat
to the community. As already noted, Garofolo would identify the extreme criminal
primarily by consideration of the criminal act; and in this respect he approaches
the position of classical criminology. The lesser criminal, however, is to be identified,
at least in part, through anthropologic and psychologic examination. But little effort
is made to demonstrate the adequacy of existing scientific knowledge and techniques
for these purposes. The reader is confidently assured that "criminology is quite
capable of" making these discriminations.9 ' At another point, Garofolo refers to
"what might be called the queen of proofs-an hereditary history of vice, madness
or crime," as indicating something of the method he contemplates.12 It is difficult
to escape the conclusion that his assurances are based on incomplete demonstration.
One need not deny the relevance of scientific knowledge and methodology to the
treatment of the criminal or the prevention of crime to recognize that the real utility
of such knowledge is dependent upon a critical appraisal of its limitations. Nor is it
necessary to labor the point that a penal system can place basic values in jeopardy
by assuming the existence of non-existent or institutionally-unavailable techniques.9 3
That Garofolo was less than sensitive to these dangers can hardly be denied.
18 See ANDENAES, op. cit. supra note 83.
"I "For the stamping out of these non-criminal offenses, it will employ punishments of greater or
less severity as necessity dictates, keeping principally in mind their intmidatory effect-their influence
as an example and warning to would-be wrongdoers." (Italics added.) CuM. at 217.
90 See note 32, supra, and accompanying text.
91 CaRi. at 228.
12Id. at 388. See also Id. at 66, 112.




Although one of the conscious and explicit purposes of Garofolo's "Criminology"*
was to challenge certain basic assumptions of classical penal theory, a full considera--
tion of his thought reveals much less than a complete rejection of the classical
position. This is indicated by his close identification of the concepts of crime and the-
criminal with attendant emphasis on the act as an index of criminality, by his quali--
fled recognition of the deterrent effect of penal sanctions, and by his attention to.
the necessity for some ordering of penalties. These correspondences may suggest
that when emphasis is directed to the real and recurring problems of criminal ad-
ministration, there are wider possibilities for attaining practical reconciliation of
diverging theoretical viewpoints than is sometimes assumed.
Nevertheless, Garofolo's differences with the classical writers, such as his fellow-
countryman, Beccaria, are frequent and important. Two of general significance
should be noted. First, there is in Garofolo's work a recognition of the relevance of
the scientific method which rarely receives a comparable emphasis in classical
criminology. This is not to deny that Garofolo's thought is pervaded by certain
untested, a priori assumptions and that many of his views so based have not sur-
vived the passing of the years. Yet his devotion to the ideal of empirical investigation
provides a mechanism for the adjustment of hypothesis and theory to new knowledge
as it is acquired.
Second, in contrast to the classical writers, there is in Garofolo's thought a per-
sistent tendency toward the exaltation of social interests and a devaluation of
of individual rights. Both Beccaria and Garofolo, interestingly enough, accept the
concept of necessity as the justification for criminal penalties. 94 But necessity means
something quite different for each. Beccaria assumes the dominance of individual
rights and accepts penal restraints only to the extent required for social coexistence,
which, in turn, leads to a fuller realization of individual rights. But Garofolo reveals
scant sympathy for any view which accords priority to interests other than those of
the group. "Metaphorically speaking," he writes, "the individual represents but a
cell of the social body."9 5 Nowhere does this tendency appear more clearly than in
his discussion of criminal procedures. 6 Recognizing that the procedures he discusses
are founded on a very different tradition from our own and that criticism by one
foreign to that experience is perilous, one cannot help but be struck by the fact that
Garofolo's whole attention is directed to the more efficient apprehension and con-
viction of offenders. Mistake or the malevolent use of state power as possibilities
demanding safeguards plays no part in his analysis. This faith in the beneficence of
political authority no doubt reveals Garofolo as a child of his times.Y But in a less
9 Compare BEccARI, op. cit. supra note 28 at 17-19 with Clmu. at 270-273, 299-308.
9- Can. at 224. See also Id. at 302, 306-308, 368.
96 Id. at 338 a seq.
97 It is worth noting, however, that Garofolo took vigorous exception to the socialism of certain
members of the Italian school, particularly Ferri. The latter, for example, wrote: "Sociology will be
socialistic or it will not exist." FEU, op. cit. supra note 8 at 17, fn. 2. A contemporary account is
interesting in this connection: "His [Garofolo's] latest volume, entitled 'Socialist Superstitions' has
excited much wrath and astonishment in socialistic and anthropological camps, and was severely
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happy day we are not free to make the same easy assumption. Accordingly, the sense
of political realities which pervades the thought of Beccaria and his school has a
relevance for the present which it obviously lacked for Garofolo.
A full appreciation of Garofolo's contribution requires a more extensive considera-
tion than can be given here of a number of specifically legal topics. His discussion
of criminal attempt, for example, remains one of the classic treatments of that
difficult subject." His perceptive criticism of the idea of premeditation and his
efforts to incorporate a more specific reference to motive in criminal legislation are
notable and require attention in any modern effort to restate the penal law 9
Admittedly, an appraisal of the continuing significance of Garofolo's "Criminol-
ogy" must recognize that, despite the value of its insights, many of the assumptions
and a great deal of the theoretical apparatus have lost much of their relevance for
modern thought. But in addition to its very real contributions, the work retains
its power to stimulate; for the issues it raises are real and persistent. Perhaps this
is enough to require of any book.
combatted, especially by Ferri, who wrote a pamphlet on purpose to confute the publication. R.
Garofolo [sik] was born in Naples, in 1852, of an old patrician family, hence perhaps by atavism he
is debarred from being a socialist." Zn=RN, Criminal Anthropology in Italy, 10 GREEN BAG 342,
382, 385 (1898).
98 Cxsm. at 308-321.
"Id. at 373-382.
[Vol. 45
